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How a Woman Scorned Threatened the Chemical Weapons
Convention
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The case of Carol Anne Bond v the United States of America stemmed from a domestic dispute when Ms. Bond attempted
to retaliate against her best friend by attacking her with chemical agents. What has emerged is a much greater issue—a
test of standing on whether a private citizen can challenge the Tenth Amendment. Instead of being prosecuted in state
court for assault, Ms. Bond was charged and tried in district court under a federal criminal statute passed as part of
implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Ms. Bond’s argument rests on the claim that the statute
exceeded the federal government’s enumerated powers in criminalizing her behavior and violated the Constitution, while
the government contends legislation implementing treaty obligations is well within its purview. This question remains
unanswered because there is dispute among the lower courts as to whether Ms. Bond, as a citizen, even has the right to
challenge an amendment guaranteeing states rights when a state is not a party to the action. The Supreme Court heard
the case on February 22, 2011, and, if it decides to grant Ms. Bond standing to challenge her conviction, the case will be
returned to the lower courts. Should the court decide Ms. Bond has the standing to challenge her conviction and further
questions the constitutionality of the law, it would be a significant blow to implementation of the CWC in the U.S. and
the effort of the federal government to ensure we are meeting our international obligations.
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Carol Anne Bond’s best friend was MyrlindaHaynes—that is, until Ms. Haynes became pregnant
and Ms. Bond discovered the father of the baby was her
own husband. Ms. Bond allegedly wanted to exact revenge
and drew on her background in microbiology to do so. Ms.
Bond attempted to poison Ms. Haynes 24 times using 10-
chloro-10-H phenoxarsine and potassium dichromate,
both of which are skin irritants and toxic in high doses if
ingested or exposed to skin. Fortunately for Ms. Haynes,
who was aware of Ms. Bond’s intent to ‘‘make her life hell,’’
she suffered only a small chemical burn to her thumb as a
result of these incidents.1
Each time Ms. Haynes called the local police, they tested
the powders for drugs but did not initiate a serious inves-
tigation. After several months of repeated occurrences, Ms.
Haynes finally contacted the postal inspector’s office,
hoping they would investigate.1 Postal inspectors acquired
surveillance video of Ms. Bond spreading chemicals on
several surfaces and placing potassium dichromate inside
envelopes in Ms. Haynes’s mailbox. Search warrants issued
by the postal inspector’s office resulted in further evidence
against Ms. Bond and the confiscation of stocks of both 10-
chloro-10-H phenoxarsine and potassium dichromate. On
June 7, 2007, authorities arrested Carol Anne Bond for
spreading chemical powders on Ms. Haynes’s car, door,
and mailbox.
Instead of being prosecuted in state court for assault, Ms.
Bond was charged and tried in district court under federal
criminal statute 18 USC x 229(a)(1) with 2 counts of
‘‘knowingly acquiring, transferring, receiving, retaining, or
possessing a chemical weapon.’’1 This particular criminal
statute was passed as part of implementation of an inter-
national treaty known as the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion (CWC).
In 1997, the Senate approved and the President ratified
the CWC, formally known as the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction. To
ensure treaty compliance, Congress passed the Chemical
Weapons Convention Implementation Act of 1998,2 in-
cluding the penal legislation at issue here. The intent of the
CWC is to prevent the use, spread, and development of
chemical weapons, and it includes a requirement that States
Parties to the treaty implement national legislation to en-
sure its obligations are met.
Treaties and Federal Law
Upon approval by the Senate and ratification by the Pre-
sident, treaties become the equivalent of federal law, con-
sidered to be the ‘‘supreme law of the land’’ (based on the
treaties clause of the Constitution [Article VI, clause 2]).
Treaties are often accompanied by what is known as im-
plementing legislation, as is the case with the CWC, either
because this is expressly required by the terms of the in-
ternational agreement itself, or in an effort to give domestic
power to ensure the effective fulfillment of federal obliga-
tions under an international agreement. Such legislation
ensures that the U.S. will meet treaty obligations through
the dual track of domestic and international law. Article VII
of the CWC, the text of which can be found in the sidebar,
requires countries signing the treaty to incorporate the
provisions into their own domestic law, including enacting
penal legislation that would punish those in violation.
The section of law used to charge Ms. Bond was incor-
porated into the U.S. criminal code for this express pur-
pose. The CWC is just one example of an international
agreement using criminal legislation to bring the treaty to
life; the majority of arms control treaties have implement-
ing legislation.
Another example, the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention (BWC), was implemented through the Bio-
logical Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, with criminal
legislation adopted as 18 USC x 175. Numerous people
have been prosecuted under the BWC implementing
Article VII of the Chemical Weapons Convention:
National Implementation Measures
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, adopt the necessary measures to implement its
obligations under this Convention. In particular, it shall:
(a). Prohibit natural and legal persons anywhere on its territory or in any other place under its jurisdiction as
recognized by international law from undertaking any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention,
including enacting penal legislation with respect to such activity;
(b). Not permit in any place under its control any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention; and
(c). Extend its penal legislation enacted under subparagraph (a) to any activity prohibited to a State Party under
this Convention undertaken anywhere by natural persons, possessing its nationality, in conformity with international
law.
Source: Text from the Chemical Weapons Convention www.opcw.org
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legislation, with the first convictions in 1994 and 1995.3
While several U.S. states do have statutes prohibiting pos-
session or use of biological and toxin weapons, the federal
criminal statute is essential to the implementation of the
BWC and to ensuring the national security of the people of
the U.S. Although states have the authority to legislate on
similar subject matter, and they often pass stricter laws than
the federal government (eg, state laws to ban smoking),
because of the Supremacy Clause, any state law in conflict
with a federal law is preempted and the federal law stands.4
Ms. Bond Goes to Jail
Ms. Bond’s lawyers argued the chemical weapons charges
should be dismissed because the statute ‘‘exceeded the
federal government’s enumerated powers, violated bedrock
federalism principles guaranteed under the Tenth
Amendment, and impermissibly criminalized conduct that
lacked a nexus to any legitimate federal interest.’’1 The
Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled the statute was
constitutional and that it did not impinge on principles of
federalism. The court denied her motion to dismiss the
claims, and Ms. Bond eventually pleaded guilty to 2 counts
of possessing and using a chemical weapon, in violation
of 18 USC x 229(a)(1); she was sentenced to 6 years in
prison.1
Convicted of her crime and sitting in federal prison, Ms.
Bond brought the case to the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. She appealed on several grounds, including
that the statute passed by Congress effectively setting forth
provisions to address criminal conduct was unconstitu-
tionally applied to address a matter that is under the ju-
risdiction of the state and beyond the reach of the federal
government under the Tenth Amendment (the federalism
clause of the Constitution, stating those powers not
explicitly granted to the federal government, unless for-
bidden, are reserved for the states). The government, on the
other hand, argued Section 229 was ‘‘enacted pursuant to a
valid international treaty, it is supported by Congress’
treaty power and the Necessary and Proper Clause.’’5 In
the end, the Third Circuit did not respond to Ms.
Bond’s constitutional arguments; it instead concluded
Ms. Bond lacked the standing to challenge the statute on
Tenth Amendment grounds where the state or its in-
strumentalities are not involved (see Tennessee Electric Co. v
Tennessee Valley Authority, where the Supreme Court con-
cluded private companies did not have standing to chal-
lenge a federal regulation in violation of the Tenth
Amendment).
Although the Supreme Court (and the Third Circuit)
avoided the question of whether the statute itself is im-
proper at this time, a determination that Ms. Bond has
standing would presumably return the issue to the Third
Circuit on remand to address the constitutionality of the
legislation. Moreover, should the Court decide in Ms.
Bond’s favor, it could potentially open the door to chal-
lenges on other legislation, not only that which implements
treaties, but legislation that may be seen as Congress
overreaching states’ rights. The government argues that
under the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I of the
Constitution, Congress has the ability to enforce a legiti-
mate treaty—in this case, a treaty to prevent the spread and
use of chemical weapons. What began as a case of a woman
scorned exacting revenge has evolved into a potential
challenge to federal treaty implementation in the U.S.
Because of conflict among appellate courts on the
standing issue, the Supreme Court accepted the case in
October 2010 on the matter of: ‘‘Whether a criminal de-
fendant convicted under a federal statute has standing to
challenge her conviction on grounds that, as applied to her,
the statute is beyond the federal government’s enumerated
powers and inconsistent with the Tenth Amendment’’—in
other words, does a party have the right to challenge a
federal conviction based on the reasoning that when applied
to her, the law goes beyond the powers given to the federal
government in the Constitution?6 To invoke standing in
federal court, a party must demonstrate they have suffered
an injury—that is, according to the Supreme Court, ‘‘an
actual or imminent invasion of a legally protected inter-
est.’’7 Interestingly, in the interim the federal government
reversed its position on the question of Ms. Bond’s stand-
ing, with the result that the Court will rule on an issue on
which both plaintiff and defendant agree.6
Discussion
The issue in front of the Supreme Court is whether Ms.
Bond can challenge her conviction under the CWC im-
plementing legislation because, as applied to her as an in-
dividual, the law is overreaching and beyond the federal
government’s powers. Without federal-level criminal stat-
utes implementing the CWC in the U.S., Ms. Bond’s
prosecution would have been for assault and/or harass-
ment,1 rather than for specific actions prohibited under the
CWC. In the Third Circuit appeal, the defendant argued
her actions were not focused on proliferating chemical
weapons and so do not violate the spirit of the CWC.
Nevertheless, her actions clearly violate articles of the treaty
banning the use of a chemical weapon.8
The case was heard before the Court on February 22,
2011. While both parties agreed on the issue of standing,
the government maintained its stance that a law written by
Congress to enforce a treaty is fully within its powers, and
Ms. Bond maintained her Tenth Amendment argument
against the constitutionality of the law. The parties to the
case in court, and supporters of either side in briefs, con-
tinue to belabor this point. The Third Circuit maintains
that when states are not a party to the suit, a private citizen
has no standing to challenge a statute in violation of the
Tenth Amendment. In the end, the majority of justices
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seemed inclined to agree that Bond should have the
standing to argue the statute is unconstitutional (although
we will not know for sure until the opinion comes out).9
The Court’s decision on whether Ms. Bond has standing
could have major political consequences, not only for its
impact on treaty implementation, but because it could lead
to an expanded interpretation of the Tenth Amendment,
thereby limiting federal power. If the Court rules the de-
fendant has standing and her claim is returned to the lower
courts, the domestic implications could be vast, depending
on the decision. The contention made by Ms. Bond, that
Congress does not have the authority to enact a law im-
pinging on state authority, is the main argument being used
by those trying to limit healthcare reform as outlined in the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.10
There has been a sea change in decisions from the Su-
preme Court surrounding issues of federalism in the past 2
decades. Congress garners a lot of its power to legislate
under the Commerce Clause, which, under Article 1,
Section 8, of the Constitution, allows regulation of inter-
state commerce. Not since World War II has there been a
case limiting the vast power this provides the federal gov-
ernment; then, in 1995, the first of a series of opinions
challenging the Commerce Clause and federal power in
general was handed down. In United States v Lopez, a stu-
dent carrying a gun was charged with violating the federal
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it illegal
to possess firearms in a school zone.11 Ultimately, the court
struck down the law as unconstitutional, holding that
regulation of handguns exceeded the power of Congress to
legislate under the Commerce Clause and that there was
not enough evidence to support the notion that ‘‘carrying
them affected the economy on a massive scale.’’11 (Of note,
after the decision, the law was rewritten with language
similar to that used in other federal gun laws and it has not
since been challenged.) Since Lopez, several other Supreme
Court decisions have limited Congress’s power, and those
opposed to the new healthcare law see Lopez as support for
its unconstitutionality (other cases include United States v
Morrison and Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v
United States Army Corps of Engineers).12
Should the court rule Ms. Bond has standing to chal-
lenge her conviction, it could be the first steps down a path
leading to a significant blow to treaty implementation in
the U.S. and the effort of the federal government to ensure
we are meeting our international obligations—not only in
Washington, but also in every state, district, and town
throughout the country. As with many treaties, the suc-
cessful implementation of the CWC hinges on U.S. prin-
ciples of federalism, and, in this case, the success happens to
hinge on creation of penalties at the federal level to meet
our treaty obligations.
If the case is returned to lower courts to answer the
question of whether the CWC should apply to Ms. Bond,
the resulting outcome could have a major impact on our
ability to enforce treaties domestically. This in turn affects
how we are viewed in the international community, how
the U.S. is viewed as respecting international law, and how
other countries choose to enforce their own treaties. Our
domestic treatment of international treaties colors our in-
teractions in international fora and negotiations. This un-
dermines the domestic effect of an internationally
negotiated and ratified arms control treaty, which can have
far-reaching consequences.
Yet, the laws need to be applied appropriately, and there
is no doubt the government must be careful not to overstep
its reach, as the Court determined Congress had done in
Lopez. Bond’s side maintained she never should have been
prosecuted under a treaty like the CWC. In a way, Ms.
Bond is correct that when the CWC was conceptualized, it
was not necessarily meant to punish her—although it was
expressly written to ensure that action by individuals as well
as governments would be prohibited. Without such federal
legislation, the government is significantly weakened when
the real criminals come along with much more than a
broken heart and powder on a mailbox.
While Ms. Bond’s infraction may be one of the lesser
crimes that could be prosecuted under this statute, the law
is crucial in the prosecution of those with much more se-
rious and large-scale intentions. Declaring 18 USC x
229(a)(1) unconstitutional would make federal prosecution
of individuals who did intend to use similar chemicals for a
larger attack much more difficult and could lead to ques-
tions surrounding those brought to court for violation of 18
USC x 175 (regarding biological weapons). The ability to
arrest and charge individuals stockpiling, transporting, or
using chemicals covered under the CWC before they cross
state lines, and without requiring every U.S. state to pass
similar legislation, is a useful tool in counterterrorism ef-
forts and for national security.
Eventually, it is likely the Supreme Court will choose
to answer the question of the Treaty Clause versus the
Tenth Amendment (whether with this case or another),
and there is no absolute guarantee they will uphold the
current assumptions that support these federal criminal
statutes. Should the Court decide Ms. Bond has standing
and return the case to the Third Circuit, her lawyers seem
to believe it will return to the Supreme Court to answer
the Treaty Clause question.9 Thus, this is a case well
worth tracking for the U.S. international law and non-
proliferation community as it progresses in the months to
come.
Update
On June 16, 2011, the Supreme Court released its decision
in Bond v United States. In a unanimous decision, the Court
ruled the defendant does have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the statute and remanded the case to the
Court of Appeals. In deciding Ms. Bond has standing, the
Court reasoned, ‘‘an individual has a direct interest in
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objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance be-
tween the National Government and the States when the
enforcement of those laws causes injury that is concrete,
particular, and redressable.’’ (Bond v United States, 564
U. S. _____ [2011]). The Court of Appeals is now tasked
with determining whether x229, the statute implementing
the Chemical Weapons Convention, is ‘‘necessary and
proper’’ for executing the President’s Treaty Power, or
whether it overreaches the government’s power in viola-
tion of the 10th Amendment. A decision that the statute
is invalid would have broad implications for treaty
implementation in the United States.
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